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ARTICLE
A FAILED ATTEMPT TO PROTECT HEDGE FUND
INVESTORS? AN INQUIRY INTO THE ALTERNATIVE
INVESTMENT FUND MANAGERS DIRECTIVE
Mariia Domina Repiquet†
ABSTRACT
Historically, hedge funds operated in a ‘legislative vacuum’, i.e., they were
structured in such a way so as to avoid falling within the scope of any
regulatory perimeter. Hedge funds were designed as an exception to the rules,
usually applicable to retail investment funds. This was achieved by offering
their units to professional investors only, who were deemed to possess
necessary skills and investment experience to protect their own interests,
without the need for any additional legislative interference. The last financial
crisis, in 2007-08, has shown the weaknesses of this approach.
The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive of 2011 is the first
pan-European attempt to regulate the hedge fund industry. It aims to create
an internal market for hedge fund managers, prevent systemic risks and
protect fund investors.
This paper discusses the duties of a hedge fund manager—conduct of
business rules—set forth in the Directive as a mechanism to protect investors.
These duties form part of the regulatory law, i.e., they establish a relationship
between a hedge fund manager and a national regulatory authority. The
breach of hedge fund manager’s duties does not give a private right of action,
meaning neither a fund nor its investors can bring a claim directly against a
hedge fund manager. These breaches are actionable by a national regulatory
authority and lead to administrative sanctions.
This paper analyzes the interrelationship between regulatory law and
private law related to hedge fund manager’s duties in the United Kingdom,
France, and Luxembourg. It argues that the mechanisms of private law—
agency and contract law—are better suited to protect interests of hedge fund
† Mariia Domina Repiquet holds an LLM International Business Law (University of
Manchester, the UK) and MSC International Finance (University of Westminster, the UK).
She is currently a PhD Candidate & Research Assistant at 7354 UMR DRES, CNRS
University of Strasbourg, France and Institute for Financial Law, Radboud University
Nijmegen, The Netherlands. She has been a Visiting Research Fellow at the Max Planck
Institute Luxembourg for International, European and Regulatory Procedural Law, Swiss
Institute for Comparative Law (Lausanne), and University of Oxford (the UK).
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investors, by allowing either a fund or its investors to bring a claim in either
contract, tort, or both, for the breach of hedge fund manager’s duties. The
Directive thus fails to a create an appropriate mechanism for the protection of
investors, as compared to the concepts of private law.
I. INTRODUCTION
The history of hedge funds dates back to the mid-1960s.1 The first hedge
fund was established by Alfred Jones, who used a combination of shortselling and leveraging to significantly outperform existing mutual funds.2
Despite the wide prominence of hedge funds, there is no agreed statutory
definition of this term. This is explained by the fact that, historically, they
operated outside of the regulatory perimeter. These funds were often
defined by what they are not, rather than by what they are.3
In essence, a hedge fund seeks to generate profits in all market
conditions.4 Traditional retail funds aspire to be as profitable as a
benchmark index (e.g., S&P 500). Conversely, hedge funds look for absolute
profits, for example, non-correlated with an overall market volatility. In
order to achieve this objective, they employ sophisticated investment
strategies with a heavy use of leverage and short-selling.
Hedge funds are often accused of endangering the financial system.5
They account for a significant portion of trading activity in financial
markets and thus represent an important counterparty risk to other market
participants, e.g., banks, brokers and clearing houses. In addition, the hedge
fund scandals (Lehman Brothers insolvency and Madoff affair) have led the
EU legislators to argue that hedge fund investors require stronger
regulatory protection.6
1. The term ‘hedge fund’ first appeared in The Jones Nobody Keeps Up With, by Carol
Loomis. See Carol J. Loomis, The Jones Nobody Keeps Up With, FORTUNE (2015).
2. Over the previous ten years, Jones’ hedge fund had outperformed mutual funds by
87%. Id.
3. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
4. DICK FRASE & PETER ASTLEFORD, HEDGE FUNDS AND THE LAW 2 (2d ed. 2016).
5. See generally Tomas Garbaravicius & Frank Dierick, Hedge Funds and Their
Implication for Financial Stability, EUR. CENTRAL BANK OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES 34 (2005).
6. Suggested protection includes particularly the need to introduce a depositary
requirement for each hedge fund. See, e.g., Petty Hollinger, et al., Luxembourg Decries French
Madoff Claims, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 13, 2009, https://www.ft.com/content/111d2388-e1ab11dd-afa0-0000779fd2ac (last visited March 3, 2018); Consultation Paper on Hedge Funds,
COM (DG Internal Market), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/
hedgefunds/ consultation_paper_en.pdf; Consultation Paper on the UCITS Depositary
Function and on the UCITS Managers’ Remuneration, COM (DG Internal Market and
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In order to protect the investors and financial markets from the
perceived threats hedge funds may pose to them, the EU has adopted the
Directive 2011/61/EU of 8 June 2011 on Alternative Investment Fund
Managers OJ L174/1 (hereinafter ‘AIFMD’). This paper discusses one of the
objectives of this Directive – a protection of investors. In doing so, this
Article will study the conduct of business rules to which the hedge fund
managers must adhere under the Directive. It is suggested that the AIFMD
has largely failed in establishing an effective mechanism for the protection
of investor’s interests. Regulatory law does nothing to ensure that either
investors or a hedge fund itself can bring an action against a hedge fund
manager. The mechanisms available in private law prior to the AIFMD are
much more effective in protecting the investors, since they provide for a
private right of action in tort and for breach of contract.
II.

ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUND MANAGERS DIRECTIVE

Prior to the 2007-08 financial crisis, hedge funds and their managers
were not subject to any specific European regulatory law. The AIFMD was
thus the very first European attempt to harmonize the alternative
investment industry. It has three objectives: (1) establishment of a single
market for alternative investment industry within the EU; (2) prevention of
systemic risk; and (3) protection of investors.7 José Manuel Barroso, the
President of the European Commission at the time of the adoption of the
AIFMD, has stated as follows:
The adoption of the directive means that hedge funds and private
equity will no longer operate in a regulatory void outside the
scope of supervisors. The new regime brings transparency and
security to the way these funds are managed and operate, which
adds to the overall stability of our financial system.8
The AIFMD regulates the alternative investment fund managers
(hereinafter ‘AIFM’) and not the alternative investment funds (hereinafter
‘AIF’) per se. This regulatory choice is mainly explained by two reasons: (1)
Services)
(2010),
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/consultations/2010/
ucits/docs/consultation_paper_en.pdf.
7. Directive 2011/61, of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 8, 2011 on
Alternative Investment Fund Managers and Amending Directives 2003/41/EC and
2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010, 2011 O.J. (L 174)
1 [hereinafter AIFMD].
8. European Commission Press Release MEMO 10/573, Statement at the Occasion of
the European Parliament Vote on the Directive on Hedge Funds and Private Equity
(November 11, 2010, MEMO/10/573).
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the array of legal forms that investment funds can take is very diverse across
the Member States and is rather difficult to harmonise;9 and (2) the
legislators are slow to catch up with the developments in financial products
and instead they should focus on the service provider who is responsible for
managing and marketing these products.10
In order to understand the significance and the nature of the AIFMD, a
short inquiry into the concept of the EU law is very helpful.
A. The Directive as EU Law
One of the objectives of the EU Law is to establish a single European
market.11 In order to achieve this goal, EU Law is based on a set of
principles that include, inter alia, the primacy of the EU Law,
proportionality, “full effectiveness, legal certainty, and effective judicial
protection.”12
The primacy of EU Law is an overriding principle that underpins all of
the primary and secondary legislation in the Union, as well as the case law
of the European Court of Justice (hereinafter ECJ). This principle has been
established in Costa v ENEL.13 It implies that the EU Law (whether a Treaty,
a Directive or a Regulation, amongst others) has an absolute and
unconditional precedence over the national law. As such, conflicting
national law provisions should be set aside. For the purposes of this
Article’s analysis, two instruments of the EU Law—a Regulation and a
Directive—will be discussed.
The EU Regulation does not require implementation into national law
and, as such, it is directly binding in all the EU Member States.14 It unifies
the law of the EU Member States. The use of regulations ensures that a
particular legal relationship is identical in all Member States, thus leaving
no room for any legislative discretion (unless directly allowed by the
Regulation).

9. AIFMD, supra note 7, at 2.
10. THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUND MANAGERS DIRECTIVE 120 (Dirk A. Zetzsche
ed., 2015). The author discusses this approach with regards to the individual portfolio
management. The same conclusion can be reached with regards to the AIFs.
11. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C
340) 1, 24.
12. SACHA PRECHAL, DIRECTIVES IN EC LAW 81 (2d ed. 2005).
13. Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64, 1964 E.C.R. 587, 593-95.
14. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art.
288, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47, 171.
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The EU Directive harmonizes national laws in a particular area of legal
relationships.15 A directive is not directly binding and requires an
implementation/transposition into the national law. It prescribes the
objectives and results to be achieved but allows the Member States to decide
how to achieve them.
One of the objectives of the Union is to establish a single EU market. A
single market enables the exercise of the three fundamental freedoms:
freedom to provide services, freedom of establishment and free movement
of capital. The objectives of the AIFMD are “[to] establish[] common
requirements governing the authorization and supervision of AIFMs”16 and
“to provide for an internal market for AIFMs and a harmonized and
stringent regulatory and supervisory framework for the activities within the
Union of all AIFMs.”17 It grants an EU passport to hedge fund managers to
provide their services within the Union (freedom to provide services),
establish their branches in any Member State (freedom of establishment)
and invest in the assets across the Union (free movement of capital).18
After the 2007-08 financial crisis, there has been a gradual shift from the
Directives to the Regulations. This is mainly explained by the fact that the
Regulations are directly binding upon the Member States and thus bring
more legal certainty. For example, the AIFMD is supplemented by the
“Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 231/2013 of 19 December
2012 . . . with regard to exemptions, general operating conditions,
depositaries, leverage, transparency and supervision.”19 It follows that the
operating conditions of hedge fund managers – a scope of this paper – are
unified across all the Union.
The Directives are often divided into the minimum or maximum
harmonization legal instruments. Veil defines the two concepts as follows:
Maximum harmonization describes the concept under which the
legislative order of a provision is exclusive, i.e. allowing no
deviations from its content in the Member States’ national laws . .
. . Minimum harmonization may be assumed in cases in which

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
83) 1.

EUROPEAN CAPITAL MARKETS LAW 36 (Rüdiger Veil ed., 2017).
AIFMD, supra note 7, at 1.
Id.
Id. at 2, 34, 54.
See Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 231/2013 of Dec. 19, 2012, 2013 O.J. (L
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the provision only contains minimum requirements that must be
met by the Member States and may be exceeded.20
In order to determine the overall spirit of the Directive, due regard
should be paid to the Recitals that often describe the legislator’s objective to
combat regulatory arbitrage and to create a single market. These objectives
signify a maximum harmonization. It follows from the Recitals of the
AIFMD that it is a maximum harmonization legal instrument.
Rather often than not, a maximum harmonization Directive may contain
minimum harmonization provisions. For example, the Article 15(3)(a)
AIFMD provides that “AIFMs shall at least . . . implement an appropriate,
documented and regularly updated due diligence process when investing on
behalf of the AIF.”21 The use of “at least” implies that the Member States
may impose stricter conditions on AIFMs with regards to risk management.
B. Duties of Hedge Fund Managers Under the Directive
In order to provide the safeguards for the investor’s interests, the
Directive imposes a set of the duties on hedge fund managers. They can be
classified under the following headings: (i) authorization requirements; (ii)
operational requirements; (iii) organization requirements, (iv) delegation;
and (v) transparency obligations. This paper analyses the operational
requirements represented by the conduct of business rules as transposed
into the national regulatory law. Conduct of business rules lay down the
standard of the behaviour to which a hedge fund manager must adhere.
These rules are deemed to represent the most important safeguard of
investor’s interests under the Directive.
Conduct of business rules are listed in the Article 12 AIFMD and include
an obligation to “act honestly, with due skill, care and diligence and fairly . .
. act in the best interests of the AIFs or the investors of the AIFs . . . avoid
conflicts of interests and . . . treat all AIF investors fairly.”22 For the sake of
legal certainty, these duties may be referred to as “a duty of care and skill.”
According to the AIFMD, the Commission Delegated Regulation shall
specify which conditions should be taken into account to assess whether an
AIFM acts with due care and skill.23
Article 21 of the Commission Delegated Regulation details these
obligations in the following manner:
20.
21.
22.
23.

EUROPEAN CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 15, at 54.
AIFMD, supra note 7, at 25.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 25.
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In order to establish whether an AIFM conducts its activities
honestly, fairly and with due skills, competent authorities shall
assess, at least, whether the following conditions are met:
(a) the governing body of the AIFM possesses adequate
collective knowledge, skills and experience to be able to
understand the AIFM’s activities, in particular the main
risks involved in those activities and the assets in which the
AIF is invested;
(b) the members of the governing body commit sufficient time
to properly perform their functions in the AIFM.
(c) each member of the governing body acts with honesty,
integrity and independence of mind;
(d) the AIFM devotes adequate resources to the induction and
training of members of the governing body.24
Let us recall that the Regulation has a direct binding force and as such, it
is directly applicable in all Member States. The use of “at least” signifies that
the Member States are allowed to impose stricter conduct of business rules
on the AIFMs authorized in their jurisdiction.
This Article will assess the components of the conduct of business rules
under the Directive below. The purpose of this analysis is to dissect the
standard of behaviour that hedge fund managers should adhere to in order
to benefit from an EU passport to manage and market hedge funds to the
EU investors.
1. The Duty to Act Honestly, with Due Skill, Care and Diligence and
Fairly in Conducting Their Activities
This requirement has a rather abstract meaning, which calls for some
additional precision as to what it practically entails. Acting honestly should
be understood both as not seeking after a hidden benefit or a profit,
whether material or immaterial, and as not withholding any important
information from the fund and its investors. Acting with due skill, care and
diligence should mean acting as a “reasonable AIFM.” In order to
determine what this criterion particularly believes, particular attention
should be given to the best-practice codes used within the AIF industry: the
24. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 231/2013 of Dec. 19, 2012, art. 21, 2013 O.J.
(L 83) 1, 26.
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Association of Alternative Investment Management. It is important to note
that in the UK and Luxembourg, a standard of care used to establish
negligence in tort has no influence on the standard of care applied for
regulatory purposes. As such, the case law of these two jurisdictions gives
no indication for the statutory content of the duty of care. Acting fairly
should mean to refrain from jeopardizing the interests of the fund and its
investors, to treat each investor equally, and to avoid any preferential
treatment.
2. The Duty to Act in the Best Interests of the AIFs or the Investors of
the AIFs they Manage and the Integrity of the Market.
Recital (12) AIFMD states that the best interests of investors refers to
their status as investors of the fund, and not to their “individual interests.”25
The interests of investors should be understood as the interests of their
totality, not as separate investors. The Implementing Regulation provides
that the AIFMs must ensure the prevention of malpractice, like “market
timing or late trading,” and to avoid applying “undue costs” to investors.26
More generally, acting in the best interests of investors implies pursuing the
interest of the investors of the fund, and not those of the fund manager. The
reference to the interests of the AIFs or the investors of the AIFs is
applicable to situations where a fund does not have a separate legal
personality. For example, in Luxembourg, a hedge fund constituted as a
common fund (fonds commun de placement) does not have a separate legal
personality. It may be structured without any governing body and as such,
it is represented by an ensemble of investors. Luxembourg law directly
allows the investors to bring a claim against a hedge fund manager on
behalf of the fund that is structured as a common fund.
3. The Duty to Prevent and Disclose the Conflicts of Interests
The Article 14(1) AIFMD requires that the AIFM takes necessary
measures to identify, manage, disclose and avoid conflicts of interests
between the fund manager and the investors of the fund. This requirement
is not new since the UK hedge fund managers were subject to the same
requirement before the introduction of the Directive.
In Luxembourg, any preferential treatment is prohibited by law. This is
so because investment management is based on the equal treatment of

25. AIFMD, supra note 7, at 3.
26. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 231/2013 of Dec. 19, 2012, 2013 O.J. (L 83)
1, 5-6.
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investors (of the same type/category). 27 The use of side letters is a common
practice to accord similar or additional rights to the investors. This is
especially the case for hedge funds, where the investors with the highest
capital stakes may require additional rights, like more frequent disclosure.
In order to comply with the principle of equal treatment, the side letter
should be written in a manner that preserves the similar rights of the same
category of investors. For example, in the case of investors with comparable
stakes, they should be treated equally and be afforded similar rights
amongst themselves. However, their rights may differ from the smaller
investors, who are a different category of shareholders. A most-favourednation clause is also frequently employed, which stipulates that the
forthcoming investors of the fund will have the same rights as existing
investors. It is submitted, therefore, that the management of the conflicts of
interests is already well regulated on the level of national law.28
4. The Duty to Treat Investors Fairly
An AIFM should ensure that its organizational framework and decisionmaking procedures provide a fair treatment of investors. It is a prerequisite
that any preferential treatment given to one investor is disclosed to a totality
of the other investors in the fund. This may result in the most-favourednation clause. Non-preferential treatment means the equal treatment of
investors; however, some investors may be treated differently than others.
The prerogative rights may include, among other things, more frequent
reporting. Once properly disclosed to the rest of AIF’s investors, this will
not constitute preferential treatment.
In addition, the AIFM must comply with the provisions listed in Article
24 of the Implementing Regulation, as to how an inducement can
potentially impair the degree of due skill, care, and diligence required from
an AIFM. It states that the hedge fund manager should not accept any
inducement from a third party that may lead to the undermining of the
investor’s interests.29
To conclude, the conduct of business rules under the AIFMD are rather
general and vague, which were already adhered to by the hedge fund
managers before the Directive.

27. LODEWIJK VAN SETTEN & DANNY BUSCH, ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUNDS IN
EUROPE: LAW AND PRACTICE 154 (2014).
28. Id.
29. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 231/2013 of Dec. 19, 2012, art. 24, 2013 O.J.
(L 83) 1, 27.
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C. Sanctions for the Breach of the Duties under Directive
No duty is effective if there is no sanction for its breach. The
transposition of the EU Directive includes not only modifying the national
substantial law but also creating procedural conditions for their
enforcement. The AIFMD provides that “Member States should lay down
rules on penalties applicable to infringements of this Directive and ensure
that they are implemented. The penalties should be effective, proportionate
and dissuasive.”30 In addition, following the reasoning of the European
Court of Justice in Von Colson, the penalties should ensure effective judicial
protection and have a deterrent effect.31
Interestingly, the sanction regime under the AIFMD differs from the
other EU Directives in financial markets law. For example, Directive
2014/65/EU of 15 May 2014 and Directive 2014/91/EU of 23 July 2014
detail administrative penalties and criteria for imposing additional criminal
sanctions under national law for breach of their rules.32 This regulatory
choice is based on the Article 83(2) TFEU, which allows introducing
criminal sanctions in the areas harmonized by the EU legislation.33 While
the AIFMD requires the remedies to be effective, proportionate and
dissuasive, it offers no further guidance on how to achieve such remedies.34
Effective sanctions should remedy any faulty behaviour, so as to achieve a
sense of overall order desired by EU Law. In the case of the AIFMD, this
should mean that any breach of conduct of business rules by hedge fund
managers should be penalized in such a manner to restore the desired level
of investors’ protection. In addition, the remedies should guarantee
effective judicial protection, which means that the procedural aspects for
bringing a claim under the EU law (as transposed into national law) should
not be less favourable than the ones for breaches of the national law. The
30. AIFMD, supra note 7, at 11.
31. See Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Case 14/83, 1984
E.C.R. 1891.
32. Directive 2014/65/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May
2014 on Markets In Financial Instruments and Amending Directive 2002/92/EC and
Directive 2011/61/EU, art. 70, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 349, 455-460; Directive 2014/91/EU of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 Amending Directive 2009/65/EC on
the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to
Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) as Regards
Depository Functions, Remuneration Policies and Sanctions, art. 1, 2014 O.J. (L 257) 186,
205-207.
33. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art.
83, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 80-81 [hereinafter TFEU].
34. See generally AIFMD, supra note 7, at 40.
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remedies should be proportionate to the offense committed and specify,
where possible, the lower and the upper limits of the sanctions to be
imposed. 35 Furthermore, the remedies should be dissuasive, preventing
further breaches of the EU law. This objective can be achieved by public
shaming—making public the administrative decisions taken against fund
managers—which deters other market players from committing the same
breaches.
III. INTERPLAY BETWEEN REGULATORY AND PRIVATE LAW
The previous part of this Paper has discussed the underlying objective of
the AIFMD, which is creating a single EU market for hedge fund managers
in order to protect investors’ interests. This objective is mainly achieved by
the introduction of conduct of business rules that hedge fund managers
should obey. The AIFMD is a regulatory law, which regulates the
relationship of the AIFM with a national regulatory authority.36 Thus, it is
not primarily concerned with regulating the relationship between a fund
manager and investors. Regulatory rules do not allow either a fund or a
fund investor to bring a claim against the hedge fund manager. The
question then arises as to how investors can protect their interests when
hedge fund managers breach regulatory rules. In other words, what is the
interplay between regulatory law and private law liability? This paper will
answer these questions based on the approach of English law. The date of
Brexit – exit of the UK from the EU – is currently fixed on 29 March 2019.
As such, before its exit from the Union, the UK remains one of the most
business-friendly EU jurisdictions. It is thus both theoretically and
practically interesting to assess under English Law how hedge fund
investors can protect their interests if a hedge fund manager fails to perform
his duties with due care and skill.
A. English Law Approach
In the UK, the AIFMD has been transposed by the Alternative
Investment Fund Managers Regulations of 2013. Its provisions form part of
the FCA Handbook rules, which represent national regulatory law in the
area of financial services. According to the English law, a breach of financial
services regulatory rules may give rise to a claim for damages only when the

35. PRECHAL, supra note 12, at 91.
36. BUSCH, supra note 27, at 13.
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statute directly allows.37 The breaches of the FCA rules are dealt with in the
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000; the only ground for bringing a
claim for the breach of the FCA rules is under section 138D of FSMA. It
states the following:
(1) A rule made by the PRA (the Prudential Regulation
Authority) may provide that contravention of the rule is
actionable at the suit of a private person who suffers loss as a
result of the contravention, subject to the defences and other
incidents applying to actions for breach of statutory duty.
(2) A contravention by an authorised person of a rule made by
the FCA [Financial Conduct Authority] is actionable at the suit
of a private person who suffers loss as a result of the
contravention, subject to the defences and other incidents
applying to actions for breach of statutory duty.
(3) If rules made by the FCA so provide, subsection (2) does not
apply to a contravention of a specified provision of the rules.
(4) In prescribed cases, a contravention of a rule which by virtue
of subsection (1) or (2) would be actionable at the suit of a
private person is actionable at the suit of a person which is not a
private person, subject to the defences and other incidents
applying to actions for breach of statutory duty.
(5) In subsections (1), (2) and (3) “rule” does not include . . . (a)
Part 6 rules; . . . (b) rules under section 137O (threshold
condition code); . . . (c) rules under section 192J (provision of
information by parent undertakings); . . . (d) a rule requiring an
authorised person to have or maintain financial resources.
(6) “Private person” has such meaning as may be prescribed.38
“Private person” is then defined in the regulation 3 of the FSMA
Regulations 2001 as “any individual, unless he suffers the loss in question in
the course of carrying on . . . any regulated activity . . . or . . . any person
who is not an individual, unless he suffers the loss in question in the course

37. GERARD MCMEEL & JOHN VIRGO, MCMEEL AND VIRGO ON FINANCIAL ADVICE AND
FINANCIAL PRODUCTS 414 (2014).
38. Amendments of Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, cl. 2, § 138D, sch. 6 (Eng.)
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of carrying on business of any kind.”39 “Carrying on a regulated activity”
implies acting as a professional in financial markets. The AIFMD, aimed at
regulating alternative investment funds that are designed for professional
investors, does not give rise to any private right of action under English law
for the breach of conduct of business rules.
Furthermore, at the first sight, this definition of “private person” makes
it clear that any individual not carrying on a regulated activity has a private
right of action. In Sivagnanam v. Barclays Bank Plc, a claim was brought
under section 138D by a sole shareholder and director, Mr. Sivagnanam, for
his loss from mis-selling of interest rate hedging products to his company. 40
Cooke, J., held that the shareholder did not fall within the category of
persons, whose interests the UK legislator intended to protect, as a matter of
interpretation. Even though the shareholder was considered to be a “private
person,” his interests were not intended to be protected by the Statute. The
alleged breaches of the COB rules were pleaded with reference to the loss of
the company only; there was no claim that the bank breached its duty of
care owed personally to a shareholder. As such, the personal interests of Mr.
Sivagnanam were not intended to be protected by the statute in this
situation.41 It follows that even when a claimant falls within the category of a
“private person,” a case-by-case assessment is necessary to determine
whether his particular interests were intended to be protected by the
Parliament.
Sivagnanam case raised another issue related to a reflective loss. The
principle of reflective loss, established in Johnson v. Gore Wood,42 states that
a shareholder cannot sue for damages for that shareholder’s loss which is
reflective of the loss of the company, if a company can itself claim damages
for that loss.
Therefore, since hedge fund investors are professional investors, they do
not fall within the category of “private persons.” In addition, a doctrine of
reflective loss will prevent a hedge fund investor from suing a hedge fund
manager for the losses of the fund. But, Section 138D does not seem to
allow a fund to initiate proceedings against the fund manager. To add to the
complexities of the situation, a standard of care required to prove the
negligence of the hedge fund manager in tort does not take into account the

39. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Rights of Action) Regulations 2001, SI
2001/2256, ¶ 3.
40. Sivagnanam v. Barclays Bank Plc [2015] EWHC 3985 (Comm).
41. Id.
42. See generally, Gardner v. Parker [2004] EWCA (Civ) 781 (discussing the findings in
Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. [2002] A.C. 1, 19).
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standard of care established by the regulatory rules. As such, under UK law,
the possibility for investors (or even a hedge fund itself) to make effective
use of the conduct of business rules under the AIFMD is non-existent.
However, the breach of regulatory rules could lead to a revocation or
suspension of the hedge fund manager authorization by the Financial
Conduct Authority.
B. Leeway Under the AIFMD to Impose Stricter Duties
It has been mentioned above that one of the objective of the AIFMD is to
create a single EU market for AIFMs. This implies that hedge fund
managers should be held to the same conduct of behaviour across all EU
Member States. Nevertheless, a careful analysis of the AIFMD and the
Commission Delegated Regulation proves the contrary. Both the Directive
and the Regulation allow the national legislator to apply a stricter standard
of the duty of care to the hedge fund managers. A frequent use of the
wording “at least” in the Directive and Regulation provides a legislative
leeway for the national discretion.
Further possibilities to introduce stricter requirements relate to the retail
hedge funds. The AIFMD is centered on those who manage the funds that
are offered to professional investors. The Member States are allowed to
impose stricter conditions on those fund managers that offer hedge fund
units to retail clients. This is because retail clients do not possess the
necessary knowledge and experience to assess the investment risks of hedge
funds, and thus require a higher standard of a regulatory protection. The
UK did not introduce stricter rules for the hedge funds aimed at retail
clients. In contrast, the French legislature has imposed the same level of the
conduct of business rules on hedge fund managers offering their securities
to retail clients as is imposed on all French investment funds offered to the
general public.43
This regulatory choice raises several questions. The ECJ decision in Von
Colson 44 highlighted the fact that national courts are required to interpret
and apply national rules, adopted under the Directive, in accordance with
its spirit. This is referred to as a principle of consistent and uniform
interpretation. In the situations involving AIFMs, national courts will be
obliged to interpret and apply relevant national law provisions in the spirit
43. Procedure de Commerecialisation de FIA en France, art. L214-24-1 et. seq.,
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?idArticle=LEGIARTI000028441432&idSectio
nTA=LEGISCTA000027763990&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006072026&dateTexte=20180320.
44. See Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Case 14/83, 1984
E.C.R. 1891.
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of the AIFMD, which is aimed toward the creation of a single European
market for AIFMs. Furthermore, this principle is not only relevant for the
courts, but also for all regulatory authorities, as a more general obligation of
the national legislator. By exercising discretion under the Directive to
impose additional duties on the AIFM where allowed, legislators in each
Member State should adhere to the objectives of the Directive. It is indeed
not only the exact wording of the Directive that should be considered but
also its general purpose; the interpretation should be purposive.45 Any
national rule that is based on the AIFMD should be purposively interpreted
in terms of achieving a single market and efficient supervision of AIFMs. A
single market objective requires an establishment of comparable, but not
identical, conditions for the authorization and operation of AIFMs across
the Union. In this case, imposing stricter rules on AIFMs in one Member
State will undermine that objective.
Furthermore, the application of stricter requirements on hedge fund
managers that manage retail hedge funds undermines the single market
rationale when a hedge fund manager simultaneously manages several
funds. For example, in case of a hedge fund structured as an “umbrella
fund,” each sub-fund has a different client base. However, these sub-funds
are managed by the same manager and constitute the same fund structure.
In this case, imposing different requirements on the same person and the
same fund structure can lead to a regulatory arbitrage, by structuring
operations in another jurisdiction with more lenient regulatory
requirements or adopting another fund design to avoid regulatory
constraints.
What happens if an AIFM is established in a Member State (the AIFM’s
home State) with less stringent requirements, but it operates in another
jurisdiction (the AIFM’s host State) that has a stricter approach? For
example, the host State may prohibit the creation of side pockets, which are
segregated accounts where risky assets are placed and which keep investors
from redeeming their shares in full until those assets are sold. However, side
pockets may be allowed under the law of the home State. If an AIFM is duly
authorized in its home State and has an EU passport to manage and market
AIFs, the host State should not impose stricter requirements on it than
those imposed in the States where the AIFM is authorized to operate. Even
though the theoretical answer seems straightforward, this may still pose
practical problems as to the determination of the precise regulatory
perimeter to which an AIFM should adhere.

45. PRECHAL, supra note 11, at 184.
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It follows that the AIFMD has largely failed in its attempt to create a
single market for the AIFMs and ensure the protection of investors. The
subsequent part of this Article will show that the existing mechanisms
under national law, even prior to the Directive, have already provided
sufficient mechanisms for the investor’s protection.
IV. PRIVATE LAW SAFEGUARDS OF INVESTOR’S INTERESTS
This part analyzes two legal concepts that apply to a hedge fund under
private law: agency law and contractual freedom. In my view, they provide
sufficient safeguards for hedge fund investors and explain the limited
success of the AIFMD.
A. Hedge Fund Manager as an Agent of the Fund
In an agency relationship, an agent has a power to create a legal
relationship for his principal vis-à-vis third parties. While an agency
relationship may arise as a matter of law, it usually arises in a contractual
relationship.46 Lord Browne-Wilkinson observes, “agency is a contract
made between principal and agent . . . like every other contract, the rights
and duties of the principal and agent are dependent upon the terms of the
contract between them, whether express or implied.”47
It follows that an agent has duties and responsibilities towards his
principal and not the third parties, due to the principle of the privity of the
contract. Thus, a hedge fund manager has duties towards a hedge fund and
not its investors. This is consistent with the approach of the AIFMD as
transposed into the national regulatory law. What duties does an agent have
towards its principal? According to Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency, “the
agent owes to the principal . . . a duty to use due diligence, or, if appropriate,
his best endeavours to achieve the result required. . . . [T]his is . . . a feature
of a contract for services . . . .”48
This duty is an overriding feature of any agency relationship and is very
much consistent with the duty of care as established under the AIFMD. All
other duties of an agent follow from his obligation to use his best
endeavours to achieve the results required by his principal. This Article will

46. Scott v. Davis, [2000] 204 C.L.R. 333, 367 (Austl.) (citing Int’l Harvester Co. of
Australia Pty Ltd. v Carrigan’s Hazeldene Pastoral Co. [1958] 100 C.L.R. 644, 652).
47. Kelly v. Cooper, [1993] A.C. 205 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Bermuda).
48. PETER WATTS & F.M.B. REYNOLDS, BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS ON AGENCY 8 (20th ed.
2014).
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analyze these duties in the light of their resemblance to the requirements set
forth in the AIFMD.
First, there is a duty to act according to the contract between an agent
and a principal. In an agency relationship between an AIFM and AIF, an
AIFM is obliged to act within the scope of his authority as established under
the service agreement. For example, if a fund is structured as a hedge fund,
an AIFM does not have the right to invest the AIF’s assets into the illiquid
assets, which are usually in the scope of private equity funds. This is
explained by the fact that the majority of hedge funds are structured as
open-ended funds, such that investors should be able to redeem their shares
at a short notice. An investment into illiquid assets may prevent the
investors from exercising their redemption rights. Nevertheless, the fund’s
foundational documents may contain a restriction on redemption. In this
case, a hedge fund manager should carefully assess the terms of a service
agreement in order to act within his authority.
Second, there is a duty to comply with the further instructions of the
principal. The principal has a control over the agent’s authority, in that the
principal can grant, limit or revoke that authority. Consequently, an agent is
under an obligation to comply with the further instructions of his principal
to maintain his authority.
Third, an agent owes a duty of care to its principal in exercising its
duties. He is under an obligation:
[T]o exercise such skill, care, and diligence in the performance of
his undertaking as is usual or necessary in or for the ordinary or
proper conduct of the profession or business in which he is
employed, or is reasonably necessary for the proper performance
of the duties undertaken by him.49
This is almost identical to the conduct of business requirements laid
down in the Article 12 of the AIFMD. However, while there is no right of
action for breach of the regulatory law, a breach of an agency obligation
creates two possible grounds for action. The principal can claim damages
for the breach of contract, and if there is a negligence involved, he can also
claim damages in tort.
Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency50 notes that the claim in tort may be
more advantageous in terms of the limitation period. In contract, the period
for bringing up an action starts from the moment of the breach. In tort,
such period starts from the moment when damage was suffered. Suppose

49. Id.
50. Id. at ¶ 6-018.
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that the contractual duty of care was breached by an agent but did not lead
to an immediate damage. In this case, at least from the perspective of
procedural law, it would be more advantageous for a claimant to exercise
his action in tort, where the time period runs from the moment of the
damage suffered. 51
Fourth, an agent owes both a duty of good faith towards its principal and
a duty to avoid conflicts of interests. The breach of these duties will involve
either a claim for damages or equitable compensation.52 This structure is
similar to the provisions of the AIFMD, but it has an advantage of
providing a claimant with a private right of action.
Fifth, a hedge fund manager should not profit from his position as an
agent, unless a principal gives his consent to such conduct. This
corresponds to the prohibition of inducements under the AIFMD. The
agent should not obtain a personal benefit from using his principal’s assets
or some confidential information (a secret profit). An AIFM should not
accept secret commissions from a third party if this will put his principal
(AIF) in a disadvantageous position. For example, if an AIFM is being
proposed a reward for investing the AIF’s assets in the shares of a particular
company, an AIFM should act only in the best interests of the AIF and its
investors and not because he will receive any secret profit from such a
dealing. In such circumstances, an agent will be liable to his principal jointly
and severally with the third party from whom he received a secret profit.
The causes of action are generally either in contract or in tort for the loss
suffered by the principal as a result of these dealings.53
By analyzing the agency relationship inherent in any dealings between a
hedge fund manager and the fund, we conclude that the duties are similar
to the regulatory law provisions under the AIFMD. However, the advantage
of agency law is that the breach of an agent’s duty provides two causes for
action—in contract and in tort—whereas, under the regulatory law those
causes of action are non-existent.

51. For an example of a case where a principal had the right to claim damages
simultaneously in contract and in tort, see, e.g., Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates, Ltd. (1995)
2 A.C. 145 (H.L. Eng.).
52. See generally Trimble v. Goldberg [1906] A.C. 494 (H.L.); Rama v. Miller [1996] 1
N.Z.L.R. 257 (P.C.); Finlayson v. Turnbull (No. 1) 1997 S.L.R. 613 (O.H.); and Imperial
Group Pension Trust Ltd. v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd. [1991] 1 W.L.R. 589.
53. Mahesan v. Malaysia Gov’t Officers’ Coop. Hous. Soc’y Ltd. [1979] A.C. 374, 374
(P.C. 1977).
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B. Contractual Freedom
The particularity of hedge funds lies, among other things, in the ability of
professional investors to tailor-make their investment agreements. The
most commonly used legal form for structuring hedge funds is a limited
partnership. It presents hedge fund investors with a double benefit of
contractual flexibility and tax transparency.
A limited partnership is characterized as a contractual relationship based
on the partnership agreement between general and limited partners.54
General partners manage a hedge fund and may also act as an AIFM if
allowed under a national law. Limited partners are investors that commit
their money to the fund without taking on any management roles.
A partnership agreement gives a high degree of contractual liberty to the
contracting parties, save for the rules relating to third parties and the public
interest or duty. Many sections of the Partnership Act 1890 and the Limited
Partnership Act 1907 use the following wording: “[s]ubject to any
agreement between the partners,”55 “[s]ubject to any agreement to the
contrary among the partners,”56 and “[s]ubject to any agreement expressed
or implied between the partners.”57 This highlights the high degree of
contractual liberty that partners are given.
Spangler observes that the contractual flexibility of the partnership refers
to the degree of flexibility that partners have in determining the precise
terms of the partnership agreement.58 As such, investors can negotiate both
the level of protection they require and the standard of care a hedge fund
manager must exercise in fulfilling his duties. Wymeersch highlights the
fact that the contractual nature of the partnership implies that almost every
term in a partnership agreement is the result of individual negotiations.59
Different partners have different standards regarding the reporting
requirements and the investment strategy of the fund, which is important
for institutional investors who may be bound by their trustee status to
invest only in certain funds. In addition, provisions related to management
fees, lock-up, gates, and side letters are of primordial importance for the
partners. A limited partnership structure allows investors to negotiate not
54. That agreement between general and limited partners is based on the principle that
“[a] partnership can only arise by a voluntary contract of the parties.” H.T. Hackney Co. v.
Robert E. Lee Hotel, 300 S.W. 1, 3 (Tenn. 1927).
55. English Partnership Act 1890, 53 & 54 Vict., §§ 32-33(1).
56. Limited Partnerships Act 1907, 7 Edw. 7 c. 24, § 4(3).
57. Id. at § 6(5).
58. TIMOTHY SPANGLER, THE LAW OF PRIVATE INVESTMENT FUNDS 130 (2d ed. 2012).
59. ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUND REGULATION 17 (Eddy Wymeersch ed., 2012).
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only the duties that the fund manager should owe to the fund but also the
mechanisms of their enforcement. If a manager breaches his duties, he will
be liable for breach of the contractual terms.
National private law provides for a comparable standard of a hedge fund
manager’s duty of care to that imposed under the Directive. The advantage
of relying on national law is having the ability to bring an action against a
hedge fund manager either in tort or for breach of contract. Such a
possibility does not exist under the regulatory law. Therefore, the conduct
of business rules as set forth in the AIFMD is a law in word only, with very
little application in practice.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has critically assessed the conduct of business rules under the
AIFMD. One of the objectives of the Directive is to protect the interests of
hedge fund investors. The analysis in this paper proves that this attempt has
largely failed. The conduct of business rules that form a part of the
regulatory law have no effect on the relationship between a hedge fund
manager and the fund, and the rules have even less of an impact on a fund’s
investors. While breach of the regulatory rules may lead to the revocation or
suspension of a hedge fund manager’s authorization license, there is no
mechanism to allow a hedge fund or its investors to bring a claim against
the manager.
The private law mechanisms—agency law and contractual freedom—
provide investors with a much better solution. If the fund manager breaches
his duties as an agent of the fund or the terms of a service agreement, either
the fund or investors can sue him in tort or for breach of contract.
In addition, the AIFMD does not fulfil its promise of fostering a single
EU market. It allows the EU Member States to impose a higher standard of
a duty of care on hedge fund managers, which leads to a disjointed
application of the regulation in the Union. An example is a French
approach that differs significantly in terms of the hedge fund manager’s
duties, as compared to the UK. As such, in terms of achieving an investor
protection objective, the AIFMD is rather a law in word only, with very
little application in practice.

